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 EDITOR’S NOTE: REFLECTIONS ON COMPARATIVE
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW
Steven L. Schooner
The editors of the Public Contract Law Journal understand that some read-
ers may hesitate before delving into an article discussing the seemingly
arcane evolution, implementation, and judicial review of the European
Union Procurement Directives. But we encourage you to sample our ever-
expanding offerings in comparative public procurement law for a host of rea-
sons. Each year we see additional evidence that both markets and supply
chains have become increasingly global, membership in the World Trade
Organization’s (WTO) Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) con-
tinues to grow (with China and its massive market marching steadily down
the free-trade path), and international contracting has become less, well,
foreign to all of us. So, go ahead and take the plunge.
If you start with Pedro Telles’ intriguing piece about thresholds in Euro-
pean Union (EU) procurements, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The EU’s
Internal Market, Public Procurement Thresholds, and Cross-Border Interest, you
will not be disappointed. The article offers a case study or anecdote into an-
other (large, diverse) public procurement regime’s struggles to reconcile a
host of the types of issues that will resonate with U.S. procurement experts:
protectionism and harmonization, efficiency and complexity (versus, of course,
simplicity), uniformity and transparency, and, of course, the role of—and
externalities generated by—judicial oversight in a heavily regulated environ-
ment. As we know from our own experience, and as Telles aptly demon-
strates in the EU context, implementation of significant policies that deter-
mine the private sector’s access to lucrative marketplaces rarely proves as
simple as anticipated.
The EU model offers unique insights to the extent that—as Americans—
we might envision the Founding Fathers attempting to conceive of and cre-
ate a unified procurement regime among the colonies (and, ultimately, the
fifty states). Of course, we already know that—while many state procurement
codes follow the federal model (or, generally, align with the ABA’s Model
Procurement Code), the FAR Council makes no effort to reconcile the var-
ious state procurement regimes, and the federal courts have no hand in man-
dating consistency between them. In that context, most American readers are
taken aback when initially exposed to efforts of the EU’s central governing
Steven L. Schooner is the Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government Procurement Law
at the George Washington University Law School.
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authorities to mandate consistent procurement practices throughout the Eu-
ropean states, regions, and even municipalities.
So, just imagine a federal court becoming involved in a New York State
procurement to the extent that the federal court mandated CICA-like proce-
dures below the New York State simplified purchasing threshold (similar to
the simplified acquisition thresholds under Part 13), to ensure that non-
New York contractors could compete for certain lower-dollar-value procure-
ments. Then consider that—despite the simple elegance of familiar thresholds
(e.g., $100,000)—the federal courts began to concur that these agreed-upon
thresholds would not apply where an ill-defined “cross-border” interest
might exist. In other words, Contracting Officers throughout the fifty states
would be implicitly tasked with conducting (prospective) market research be-
fore making a below-threshold (and, thus, simplified acquisition) purchase,
or risk having their procurement interrupted and/or sanctioned by a federal
court. Toto, I’ve a feeling we’re not in Kansas anymore! 1
For those of you that read, or at least peruse, the Journal in order, you will
notice that the comparative thread continues. Collin Swan compares (and
contrasts) the evolution of disappointed offeror (or bid protest) litigation
in the United States and the EU in his article, Lessons from Across the Pond:
Comparable Approaches to Balancing Contractual Efficiency and Accountability in
the U.S. Bid Protest and European Procurement Review Systems. The Journal
then turns the focus inward, as Keith Lusby examines U.S. subcentral do-
mestic government procurement challenge procedures in his article, Improv-
ing the Effectiveness of State Bid Protest Forums: Going Above and Beyond the
Agreement on Government Procurement and Adopting the ABA’s Model Procure-
ment Code.
The more I learn about public procurement regimes abroad, the better
I understand the longstanding policies we take for granted and the difficult
choices and complex trade-offs inherent in acquisition reform. For that rea-
son, I hope you take the time to sample these pieces and other comparative
offerings forthcoming in the Public Contract Law Journal.
1. THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The primary law applicable to public procurement in Europe can be
found in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU
or Treaty).1 The European Union (EU) regulations regarding public pro-
curement were enacted to help create a European Internal Market.2
Pedro Telles (p.telles@bangor.ac.uk) is a Lecturer in Law and Procurement Law Specialist
at the Institute of Competition and Procurement Studies in the School of Law at Bangor
University in the United Kingdom.
1. See generally Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) [hereinafter TFEU].
2. The Internal Market aims to integrate the different Member States’ markets into a single
European market. Its legal framework is set in Article 26 of the Treaty. See id. art. 26, at 59. For
a discussion on the Internal Market, see DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 674–711 (2d ed. 2010); PAUL CRAIG & GRA´INNE DE BU´RCA, EU LAW: TEXT,
CASES, AND MATERIALS 581–610 (5th ed. 2011); Kamiel Mortelmans, The Common Market, the
3
Although the Treaty does not specifically address public procurement, to
ensure the achievement of the EU’s Internal Market,3 certain principles con-
tained in it are applicable to public procurement.4 Articles 34, 49, 55, and 56
of the Treaty enshrine principles such as equality and nondiscrimination,
free movement of goods and services, and establishment, all of which are ap-
plicable to public procurement.5 These principles—key tenets underpinning
the EU regulatory framework of public procurement—impose negative ob-
ligations on contracting authorities to ensure they do not discriminate
against undertakings based in other EU Member States.6 The Treaty prin-
ciples by themselves, however, were insufficient to develop a policy and more
comprehensive regulation was required.7
More comprehensive regulation was achieved via two methods: case law
from the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court of Justice),
which has developed the principles over the last fifty years; and secondary
legislation in the form of public procurement Directives.8 The first round
of public procurement Directives was adopted in the 1970s;9 resulting regu-
lations, derived from the Directives, have been updated roughly once a dec-
ade. The current procurement Directives, commenced in 2004,10 are cur-
Internal Market and the Single Market, What’s in a Market?, 35 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 101
(1998); Christopher Bovis, The Regulation of Public Procurement as a Key Element of European Eco-
nomic Law, 4 EUR. L.J. 220, 220–29 (1998).
3. For a discussion of the purposes of European Union (EU) regulation in public procure-
ment, see Sue Arrowsmith, The Purpose of the EU Procurement Directives: Ends, Means and the
Implications for National Regulatory Space for Commercial and Horizontal Procurement Policies, in
14 CAMBRIDGE YEARBOOK EUR. LEGAL STUDIES 1, 1–47 (2012) [hereinafter Arrowsmith, The Pur-
pose of the EU Procurement Directives]; Martin Trybus, Public Contracts in European Union Internal
Market Law: Foundations and Requirements, in COMPARATIVE LAW ON PUBLIC CONTRACTS 81,
81–121 (Rozen Noguellou & Ulrich Stelkens eds., 2010); Sue Arrowsmith, The Past and Future
Evolution of EC Procurement Law: From Framework to Common Code?, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 337, 339
(2006) [hereinafter Arrowsmith, The Past and Future Evolution of EC Procurement Law]; Berend
Jan Drijber & He´le`ne Stergiou, Public Procurement Law and Internal Market Law, 46 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 805 (2009).
4. See TFEU, supra note 1, arts. 34, 49, 55 & 56, at 61, 67, 69–70.
5. Id.
6. See SUE ARROWSMITH, THE LAW OF PUBLIC AND UTILITIES PROCUREMENT 181, 209–211
(2d ed. 2005).
7. See generally JOSE´ M. FERNA´NDEZ MARTI´N, THE EC PUBLIC PROCUREMENT RULES: A CRIT-
ICAL ANALYSIS 4–37 (1996); ARROWSMITH, THE LAW OF PUBLIC AND UTILITIES PROCUREMENT,
supra note 6, at 181–218; PETER TREPTE, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN THE EU: A PRACTITIONERS
GUIDE 1–27 (2d ed. 2007).
8. Directives impose obligations on the Member States to achieve stated objectives. Sue
Arrowsmith, Introduction to the EU, in EU PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 28
(Sue Arrowsmith ed., 2010). Each Member State must transpose the Directives into their na-
tional law and comply with the stated objectives, but the Member States have a degree of dis-
cretion on how to achieve such objectives. Id.
9. See, e.g., Council Directive 71/305, 1971 O.J. (L 185) 682 (EC). For a background on the
historical evolution of public procurement regulation in Europe, see ARROWSMITH, THE LAW OF
PUBLIC AND UTILITIES PROCUREMENT, supra note 6, at 119–61.
10. See Council Directive 2004/17, 2004 O.J. (L 134) 1 (EC) (the Utilities Directive); Council
Directive 2004/18, 2004 O.J. (L 134) 114 (EC) (the Public Sector Directive or Classical Direc-
tive). There are other Directives applicable to public procurement. See, e.g., Council Directive
92/13, 1992 O.J. (L 76) 14 (EC) (effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of
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rently being revised and a final version is expected before the end of 2013.11
The Directives’ scope has expanded to cover more contracts and sectors, and
they have become increasingly more detailed, to the point that Member
States, such as the United Kingdom and Denmark, have transposed the
2004 Directives into their national legislation with minimal alterations.12 In-
deed, to say a contract is covered by EU public procurement regulations is to
say that it is covered by the substantive public procurement Directives.13
Crucially, the regulations are only applicable to contracts over certain fi-
nancial thresholds.14 There are different thresholds, however, and determin-
ing which particular one applies depends on three factors: the sector (general
or utilities), the contract nature (works, goods, or services), and the contract-
ing authority (central government or others).15 These different thresholds
will be examined in more detail in Part II. Below the thresholds, Member
States are free to regulate procurement and all of them do so in one way
or another.16 The exceptions to this rule are contracts that fall below the
financial threshold but that have a “cross-border interest.”17 The Treaty
principles are applicable to these contracts and function, ultimately, as a con-
straint on national rules.18
public contracts); Council Directive 2009/81, 2009 O.J. (L 216) 76 (EC) (defense sector); Coun-
cil Directive 2007/66, 2007 O.J. (L 335) 31 (EC) (remedies). For background on Council Direc-
tive 2007/66 (remedies), see Roberto Caranta, Many Different Paths, But Are They All Leading to
Effectiveness?, in 3 ENFORCEMENT OF THE EU PUBLIC PROCUREMENT RULES (Steen Treumer &
Franc¸ois Liche`re eds., 2011).
11. Current reform is focused on the substantive Classical and Utilities Directives. See Pro-
posal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Public Procurement, COM
(2011) 896 final (Dec. 20, 2011); Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil on Procurement by Entities Operating in the Water, Energy, Transport and Postal Services Sectors,
COM (2011) 895 final (Dec. 20, 2011). The Commission also plans to propose a Directive on
service concessions in the near future. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Award of Concession Contracts, COM (2011) 897 final (Dec. 20, 2011).
12. See generally ASHURST, UK PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 1–2 (2012) (describing EU and United
Kingdom (UK) legislation on procurement and stating that “[i]n the UK, national legislation on
public procurement implements the Directives”); MOALEM WEITEMEYER BENDTSEN, DANISH
REGULATION OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENTS, http://www.mwblaw.dk/da-dk/Doing%20Business%
20in%20Denmark/~/media/Doing%20Business%202013/Danish%20Regulation%20of%20Public
%20Procurements.ashx (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (“Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of
procedures for the award of public work contracts, public supply contracts and public service con-
tracts and Directive 2004/17/EC coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in
the water, energy, transport and postal service sectors are both implemented into Danish law.”).
13. See generally Arrowsmith, The Purpose of the EU Procurement Directives, supra note 3, at 4–5
(emphasizing the importance of the Directives and their role in filling in gaps created by the
TFEU).
14. See Commission Interpretive Communication on the Community Law Applicable to Contract
Awards Not or Not Fully Subject to the Provisions of the Public Procurement Directives, 2006 O.J.
(C 179) 2, 2 & n.2 [hereinafter Commission Interpretive Communication] (“Threshold values are
set in Article 7 of Directive 2004/18/EC and Article 16 of Directive 2004/17/EC.”).
15. See infra Tables 1–4.
16. See Sue Arrowsmith, The Public Sector Directive 2004/18: Scope of Coverage, in EU PUBLIC
PROCUREMENT LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 8, at 100–01.
17. See discussion infra Part IV.
18. See ARROWSMITH, THE LAW OF PUBLIC AND UTILITIES PROCUREMENT, supra note 6, at 209.
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Under the current system, the thresholds are so high that only 17.7% of
all procurement expenditures are covered by the EU public procurement
Directives.19 Thus, over eighty percent of all money that is spent on public
procurement in the EU is not governed by European law.20 If EU procure-
ment regulation is important for fulfilling the Internal Market objective, why
is this ratio skewed against the Directives?21 Further complicating the issue,
the Court of Justice has been attempting to define “cross-border interest” for
almost fifteen years but has failed to supply a definition that provides any de-
gree of legal certainty.22 The Court of Justice proposes an evolving concept
of cross-border interest, but rather than fully define cross-border interest,
the Court only provides examples. For instance, whereas originally the sim-
ple potential of cross-border interest by foreign undertakings was sufficient to
satisfy the test, currently the Court appears to demand that such interest
needs to be real, not hypothetical.23 The test, however, is impossible to
carry out reliably in advance of bidding. This lack of legal certainty24 is,
therefore, the primary drawback of the cross-border interest test as created
by the Court of Justice.
This Article acknowledges that the Court of Justice was correct to con-
sider that there is an Internal Market composed of contracts whose financial
value falls below the EU thresholds. But the correct approach for achieving
the Internal Market objective would be to lower the thresholds, and thereby
apply all EU law (Treaty Principles and Directives’ rules) to most contracts
tendered. This should be done in conjunction with simplifying the open
procedure25 for small-value contracts to avoid increasing transaction and
opportunity costs.
19. For the percentage of public contracts advertised in the Official Journal of the European
Union (O.J.) in 2011, see EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT INDICATORS 2011, at
6 (Dec. 5, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/
modernising_rules/public-procurement-indicators-2011_en.pdf (hereinafter PUBLIC PROCURE-
MENT INDICATORS 2011).
20. See id.
21. See generally id.
22. See Adrian Brown, EU Primary Law Requirements in Practice: Advertising, Procedures and
Remedies for Public Contracts Outside the Procurement Directives, 19 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV.
169, 170 (2010).
23. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
24. See id. (“The manner in which public contracts must be awarded to comply with the ge-
neral principles of EU law is not always clear.”).
25. The current Public Sector Directive establishes that, by default, contracting authorities
should use either the open or restricted procedures to award contracts. Council Directive
2004/18, supra note 10, at 13411. Both of these procedures have strong transparency and
equal treatment safeguards to ensure that participants are not discriminated against. See
PWC ET AL., PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN EUROPE: COST AND EFFECTIVENESS REPORT 15 (2011)
[hereinafter COST AND EFFECTIVENESS REPORT] (describing the equal treatment safeguards).
The difference between the open and restricted procedure lies in the way that participants are
admitted to present bids. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., SIGMA PAPERS NO. 45, PUBLIC
PROCUREMENT IN EU MEMBER STATES—THE REGULATION OF CONTRACT BELOW THE EU
THRESHOLDS AND IN AREAS NOT COVERED BY THE DETAILED RULES OF THE EU DIRECTIVES 16
(2010) [hereinafter THE REGULATION OF CONTRACT BELOW THE EU THRESHOLDS] (stating a dif-
ference in time periods between the two systems). In the restricted procedure, only the best
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II. CURRENT THRESHOLDS
The different EU public procurement thresholds are set every two years
by the European Commission via Regulations.26 The current thresholds
were set by Regulation EC 1251/2011 and are valid for 2012 and 2013.27
The proposed Directives will establish thresholds going forward; the overall
values remain unaltered, other than adding a new threshold for social care
services at €750,000.28
Table 1. Current Threshold Values for Contracts Covered by the
Public Sector and Defense Directives29
Public Sector and Defense Threshold Value
Works $6,640,000 (€5,000,000)
Annex B Services $265,000 (€200,000)
Supplies and Services (Central Government) $172,000 (€130,000)
Certain Supplies in the Field of Defense $265,000 (€200,000)
Supplies and Services (Sub-central Government) $265,000 (€200,000)
Table 2. Current Threshold Values for Contracts Covered
by the Utilities Directive30
Utilities Sector Threshold Value
Works $6,640,000 (€5,000,000)
Supplies and Services $530,000 (€400,000)
“x” candidates are invited to present bids, whereas in the open procedure any participant that
satisfies the minimum selection criteria (financial standing, technical capacity, and experience)
must be allowed to submit tenders. COST AND EFFECTIVENESS REPORT, supra, at 15. The safe-
guards, timescales, and overall bureaucracy render the open procedure as established by the
Public Sector Directive inadequate for the tendering of low-value contracts. See generally id.
26. SWEETT GRP., A USER’S GUIDE TO EU PROCUREMENT RULES 10 (2012).
27. Alistair Maughan, UK Public Procurement Law Digest: New Threshold Values for 2012 &
2013, MORRISON FOERSTER 1 (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.mofo.com/files/uploads/images/
111219-uk-public-procurement-law-digest.pdf.
28. ASHURT LLP, EUROPEAN COMMISSION PUBLISHES NEW LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS ON PUBLIC
PROCUREMENT (2012). The thresholds within the Public Sector Directive will come into force on
June 30, 2014. Id.
29. Maughan, supra note 27, at 1.
30. Maughan, supra note 27, at 1–3.
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Comparing Tables 1 and 2 with Tables 3 and 4, the financial thresholds
applicable to EU public procurement are slightly lower than the GPA
thresholds. Arguably, the GPA agreement values establish an upper bound-
ary for the EU thresholds; if the EU thresholds were higher, then the EU
would not be compliant with its own GPA commitments. It is worth noting
that the EU thresholds are neither identical to the GPA threshold values nor
much lower, but rather are just close enough to be within a similar value
bracket. Furthermore, while the current EU thresholds are limited on
their upper boundary by the GPA, nothing impedes the EU from setting
lower thresholds.
Tables 1 and 2 also illustrate that multiple thresholds can be applied to a
contract. The actual threshold applicable depends on the type of contract
and contracting authority.33 This makes the application of EU rules unnec-
essarily complex. The same substantive contract may be subject to different
Table 3. Current Government Procurement Agreement (GPA)
Threshold Values for Contracts Tendered by
European Central Contracting Authorities31
Government Procurement
Agreement (Central authorities)
Value (Special
Drawing Rights) Threshold Value
Works SDR 5,000,000 $7,538,000 (€5,680,000)
Supplies SDR 130,000 $196,006 (€148,000)
Services SDR 130,000 $196,006 (€148,000)
Table 4. Current GPA Threshold Values for Contracts Tendered by
European Sub-central Contracting Authorities32
GPA (Sub-central
authorities)
Value (Special
Drawing Rights) Threshold Value
Works SDR 5,000,000 $7,538,000 (€5,680,000)
Supplies SDR 200,000 $301,548 (€227,000)
Services SDR 200,000 $301,548 (€227,000)
31. Annex to the Proposal for a Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Protocol Amending the
Agreement on Government Procurement, at 60, COM (2013) 143 final (Mar. 22, 2013). SDR
(special drawing rights)–Euro exchange rate as of September 30, 2013, rounded to the nearest
thousand. Currency Units per SDR for July 2013, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/
external/np/fin/data/rms_mth.aspx?SelectDate=2013-07-31&reportType=CVSDR (last visited Oct. 1,
2013). The same exchange rates are used in all figures hereinafter.
32. Annex to the Proposal for a Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Protocol Amending the
Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 31, at 60; Currency Units per SDR for July
2013, supra note 31.
33. COST AND EFFECTIVENESS REPORT, supra note 25, at 69.
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thresholds, depending on the nature of the contracting authority awarding
it.34 For example, servicing a piece of equipment by a contracting authority
covered by the Utilities regime will only have to be advertised if valued over
€400,000.35 An identical contract for the same piece of equipment, if ten-
dered by a local government, must only be advertised if valued over
€200,000 and if tendered by the Central Government, the threshold is
only €130,000.36 It is illogical to set three different thresholds to govern con-
tracts that are identical, in almost every sense, except for their source. Is the
contract not equally important for the Internal Market, regardless of its
source?
The procurement framework would benefit from a simplification of the
threshold system and unification of thresholds across the whole spectrum.37
Authors Sue Arrowsmith and Rosemary Boyle, however, suggest that the
threshold unification should be achieved by increasing the threshold values
of the Public Service and Defence Directives to match that of the Utilities
Directive.38 This proposal would have a limited effect in practice because
the thresholds are currently so high that they exclude “as much as [eighty]
percent of ” the public procurement expenditures, in the EU, from regula-
tion by the EU Directives.39
III. CONTRACTS ABOVE THE EU THRESHOLDS
In 2011, only 17.7% of all public procurement expenditures in the EU
were advertised in the Official Journal of the European Union (O.J.).40 This
percentage is predominantly comprised of contracts with a value above the
EU thresholds (thus covered by the procurement Directives), and some
with a value below the EU thresholds but having a cross-border interest.41
Service concessions and contracts with a value below the thresholds can
also fall within this latter category.42 This begs the question: if the objective
34. Id.
35. See supra Table 2.
36. See supra Table 1.
37. Sue Arrowsmith, Modernising the European Union’s Public Procurement Regime: A Blueprint
for Real Simplicity and Flexibility, 21 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 71, 73 (2012) [hereinafter
Arrowsmith, Modernising the European Union’s Public Procurement Regime].
38. See id. at 72–73; Rosemary Boyle, EU Procurement Green Paper on the Modernisation of EU
Public Procurement Policy: A Personal Response, 20 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. NA171, NA181
(2011).
39. See COST AND EFFECTIVENESS REPORT, supra note 25, at 91. Even if the thresholds were to
be raised by fifty percent, it would reduce the scope of the Directives five percent per value and
twelve percent in the number of contracts. Id. at 5.
40. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT INDICATORS 2011, supra note 19, at 6 (showing the percentage of
public contracts advertised in the O.J. in 2011). In addition to the paper format, information
on tenders is also published online. See Tenders Electronic Daily, EUROPA, http://ted.europa.eu
(last visited Oct. 01, 2013).
41. See generally PUBLIC PROCUREMENT INDICATORS 2011, supra note 19.
42. See generally COST AND EFFECTIVENESS REPORT, supra note 25, at 69. For notices on the
O.J. between 2006 and 2010, as found by the Commission, where perhaps eighteen percent
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of EU public procurement regulation is to protect and help achieve the In-
ternal Market, why are over eighty percent of public contracts exempt from
most EU procurement rules? The Internal Market for public procurement is
surely larger than the 17.7% of the total amount of public contracts adver-
tised inside the EU.
There is no obvious reason for this disparity between the Internal Market
objective and the regulation of less than twenty percent of its public procure-
ment expenditures.43 Two different justifications, however, may be put for-
ward. First, regarding public procurement, the EU only has jurisdiction to
regulate areas covered by the Internal Market.44 Therefore, in theory, na-
tional laws should not solely regulate a public contract of a national nature.45
Second, international politics may be at play; namely, the desire by Member
States to have thresholds as high as possible to function as a de facto protec-
tionist regime.46
Regarding the first justification, it is a well-established tenet that EU law
can only apply to situations where the EU treaties confer upon it either an
exclusive or joint competence to regulate.47 The development of the Internal
Market is an area of EU competence; therefore, EU law can only regulate
the contracts that have a cross-border interest.48 Contracts outside the Inter-
nal Market, i.e., without cross-border interest, remain within Member
States’ power to regulate.49
There is no certainty, however, that the above-threshold contracts cov-
ered by the Directives are actually part of the Internal Market.50 These con-
tracts potentially could not have cross-border interest, but they are governed
nonetheless by EU and not national law.51 The EU thresholds are blunt, bi-
nary instruments: over the thresholds, EU provisions contained in the public
procurement Directives are fully applicable, but below the thresholds they
of such notices are for contracts under the EU thresholds, see id. at 69. For a discussion of rel-
evant case law and practical options for advertising contracts and concessions, see Brown, supra
note 22, at 169–76.
43. See PUBLIC PROCUREMENT INDICATORS 2011, supra note 19, at 6; COST AND EFFECTIVENESS
REPORT, supra note 25, at 13.
44. See generally TFEU, supra note 1, art. 5 at 18; Arrowsmith, The Purpose of the EU Procure-
ment Directives, supra note 3, at 4–15; Sue Arrowsmith, The EC Procurement Directives, National
Procurement Policies and Better Governance: The Case for a New Approach, 27 EUR. L. REV. 3, 4–5
(2002) (describing the European Commission Treaty and Directives that regulate the Internal
Market).
45. See Arrowsmith, Modernising the European Union’s Public Procurement Regime, supra note
37, at 72.
46. See discussion infra Part IV.
47. EU Law, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/eu-law/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (“[E]very action
taken by the EU is founded on treaties that have been approved voluntarily and democratically
by all EU member countries.”).
48. See Brown, supra note 22, at 170; Sue Arrowsmith, The TFEU Rules, in EU PUBLIC PRO-
CUREMENT LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 8, at 78 (“TFEU obligations will apply only to
contracts that are considered of ‘certain cross-border interest.’ ”).
49. See THE REGULATION OF CONTRACT BELOW THE EU THRESHOLD, supra note 25, at 5, 12.
50. See id.
51. Id.
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are not.52 Crucially, for above-threshold contracts, there is no assessment of
their impact on the Internal Market.53 Curiously, no above-threshold con-
tract is ever checked for cross-border interest.54 Presumably it is assumed
that by definition, such a contract has cross-border interest.55 The rules
are simply applicable without questioning.56 There is a different approach,
however, for the contracts falling below the thresholds.57 For below-threshold
contracts, the cross-border interest is the “litmus test” justifying the applica-
tion or nonapplication of EU law;58 specifically, the EU Treaty principles
discussed in Part I.
For above-threshold contracts, Member States appear to have traded the
purity of the EU legal regime—that would demand a cross-border interest
test—for convenience and legal certainty.59 It is much more convenient to
know, at a glance, if a certain legal regime is applicable rather than conduct
a detailed analysis, in advance, to determine the applicable regime.60 Mem-
ber States just assume that contracts over a certain value are, in theory, rel-
evant to the Internal Market for the benefit of legal certainty and clarity.61
This trade-off is reasonable; one of the consequences of the EU regulation
of public procurement is the harmonization of legislation in twenty-eight
Member States, each with competing interests and legal traditions.62 As
such, the legal certainty produced by this trade-off is beneficial, particularly
in comparison with the cross-border interest test that the Court of Justice
has tried to develop for contracts falling under the EU thresholds.63
It appears that EU law is, in reality, being applied to contracts that may
have no cross-border interest and therefore no connection with the Internal
Market.64 Consequently, the conclusion can only be that the EU threshold
values are arbitrary and influenced by politics.65 For example, the European
Commission’s proposal for the original Works Directive contended that
52. See id.
53. Accord Case C-87/94, Comm’n v. Belgium, 1996 E.C.R. I-2043, I-2080.
54. See id.
55. See Arrowsmith, supra note 44, at 4–5 (“[Public Procurement Directives] apply to
contracts above certain financial thresholds, intended to identify contracts of cross-border
interest.”).
56. See id.
57. See THE REGULATION OF CONTRACT BELOW THE EU THRESHOLD, supra note 25, at 12.
58. See infra Part IV.
59. CARINA RISVIG HANSEN, CONTRACTS NOT COVERED, OR NOT FULLY COVERED, BY THE
PUBLIC SECTOR DIRECTIVE 108 (2012).
60. See id. at 121–22.
61. See Roberto Caranta, The Borders of EU Public Procurement Law, in 4 OUTSIDE THE EU
PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVES—INSIDE THE TREATY? 25, 40, 44–48 (Roberto Caranta & Dacian
Dragos eds., 2012); cf. RISVIG HANSEN, supra note 59, at 121–22.
62. See Caranta, supra note 61, at 44.
63. See discussion infra Part IV.
64. See RISVIG HANSEN, supra note 59, at 106–07.
65. See id. at 106–07 (explaining that the thresholds are based on assumptions and concerns
over practicality); Case C-412/04, Comm’n v. Italy, 2008 E.C.R. I-619, I-638–39.
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publicity for all contracts would not be practical.66 The EU thresholds arise
from an acceptable compromise between Member States to open their na-
tional markets to the competition of foreign economic providers.67 They
are essentially a de facto nontariff trade barrier for the contracts falling
below them.68
IV. LIFE BELOW THE EU THRESHOLDS: THE
(R)EVOLVING JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURT OF
JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Below the EU thresholds, one would expect the rules to be as clear as
above: only national rules would be applicable. In reality, national rules
only apply when the contract at issue has no cross-border interest.69 This
is where difficulties arise.
The Court of Justice concluded, almost fifteen years ago in Telaustria,70
RI.SAN.,71 and Unitron,72 that contracts with a cross-border interest should
be subject to the Treaty principles even if their value was under the thresh-
olds;73 Member States previously applied national rules to such contracts.74
Particularly, until Telaustria, the system was simple: above the thresholds,
EU law applied to the contract; below, only national rules applied.75
66. Proposal for a First Directive of the Council on the Co-ordination of Procedures for the Conclusion
of Public Works Contracts, at 12, COM (64) 233 final ( July 23, 1964).
67. Commission White Paper for the Completion of the Internal Market, at 7, COM (85) 310 final
( June 14, 1985).
68. Id.
69. For more information on this topic, see RISVIG HANSEN, supra note 59; Caranta, supra note
62, at 26–28; Erik Pijnacker Hordijk & Maarten Meulenbelt, A Bridge Too Far: Why the European
Commission’s Attempts to Construct an Obligation to Tender Outside the Scope of the Public Procurement
Directives Should Be Dismissed, 14 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 123, 123–30 (2005); Brown, supra
note 22, at 170; Sylvia De Mars, The Limits of General Principles: A Procurement Case Study, 38
EUR. L. REV. 316, 317 (2013); Peter Braun, A Matter of Principle(s)—The Treatment of Contracts
Falling Outside the Scope of the European Public Procurement Directives, 9 PUB. PROCUREMENT
L. REV. 39, 40–44 (2000).
70. See Case C-324/98, Telaustria Verlags GmbH v. Telekom Austria AG, 2000 E.C.R.
I-10745, I-10746.
71. Cf. Case C-108/98, RI.SAN. Srl v. Comune di Ischia, 1999 E.C.R. I-5219, I-5224, I-5248
(stating that “Article 55 of the EC Treaty (now Article 45 EC) does not apply” if all of the facts
are contained in one Member state).
72. See Case C-275/98, Unitron Scandinavia A/S v. Ministeriet for Fødevarer, Landbrug og
Fiskeri, 1999 E.C.R. I-8291, I-8317–18.
73. See Case C-59/00, Bent Mousten Vestergaard v. Spøttrup Boligselskab, 2001 E.C.R.
I-9505, I-9513–14; Case C-264/03, Comm’n v. France, 2005 E.C.R. I-8831, I-8832; Joined
Cases C-147/06 & C-148/06, SECAP SpA v. Comune di Torino, 2008 E.C.R. I-3565, I-3566;
Case C-412/04, Comm’n v. Italy, 2008 E.C.R. I-619, I-638–39.
74. The argument to include contracts with cross-border interest that are otherwise excluded
from the application of the Treaty principles is valid as well for other excluded contracts, such as
services concessions, which are not the object of this paper. It should be noted, however, there
are plans for a new Directive for concessions to be introduced after the reform process of the
current procurement Directives is concluded.
75. See Case C-324/98, Telaustria, 2000 E.C.R. at I-10746.
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Following Telaustria, in Coname and Parking Brixen, the Court held that
even if contracts are excluded from the Directives, they might still have a
cross-border interest for undertakings from other Member States and, as
such, require application of the Treaty principles.76 The Court, however,
failed to explain if that interest needed to be direct or indirect, or real or hy-
pothetical.77 Additionally, the Court has been inconsistent in its jurispru-
dence. Until recently, the Court of Justice had expanded the reach of the
Treaty principles to contracts not covered by the Directives.78 It has thus
contributed to the creation of an increasingly complex legal regime applica-
ble to contracts falling below the thresholds, the precise contracts that would
benefit from less burdensome and clearer regulation.79 Moreover, academics
have expressed their concerns about the expanding reach of the Court of Jus-
tice80 and highlighted, inter alia, the costs to achieving legal certainty.81
In 2006, the European Commission reminded the Member States of their
ongoing obligation of compliance with Treaty principles in an Interpretive
Communication and explained the implications of the existing case law for
Member States.82 This interpretive communication, however, did not
move the discussion regarding achieving legal certainty forward; instead, it
led Germany to initiate unsuccessful proceedings against the Commission.83
A. Direct or Indirect Cross-Border Interest?
In Coname and Parking Brixen the Court of Justice held that a contract
must have a direct cross-border interest in order for the Treaty principles
76. See Case C-231/03, Consorzio Aziende Metano (Coname) v. Comune di Cingia de’ Botti,
2005 E.C.R. I-7287, I-7294–95; Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen GmbH v. Gemeinde Brixen and
Stadtwerke Brixen AG, 2005 E.C.R. I-8585, I-8595, I-8598; see also Dermot Cahill, The Ebb and
Flow, the Doldrums and the Raging Tide: Single Market Law’s Ebb and Flow over Services of General
Economic Interest, the Legal Doldrums over Services of General Interest, and the Raging Tide of Article
106(2) (ex Art 86(2)) over State Aid & Public Procurement, 21 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 629, 632–33
(2010).
77. See C-231/03, Coname, 2005 E.C.R. at I-7295; Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen, 2005
E.C.R. at I-8590.
78. Compare Case C-324/98, Telaustria, 2000 E.C.R. at I-10746 (solidifying that contracts
with cross-border interest should be subject to Treaty principles), and Case C-231/03, Coname,
2005 E.C.R. at I-7294–95, and Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen, 2005 E.C.R. at I-8586, with Case
C-95/10, Strong Seguranc¸a SA v. Municı´pio de Sintra, 2011 E.C.R. I-1867, I-1883 (limiting the
influence of Treaty principles as applied to contracts with cross-border interests).
79. See Case C-324/98, Telaustria, 2000 E.C.R. at I-10746; Case C-231/03, Coname, 2005
E.C.R. at I-7294–95; Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen, 2005 E.C.R. at I-8586–87.
80. See Caranta, supra note 62, at 46–47.
81. See id. at 47; Adrian Brown, Seeing Through Transparency: The Requirements to Advertise
Public Contracts and Concessions Under the EC Treaty, 16 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 1, 19–20
(2007); Pijnacker Hordijk & Meulenbelt, supra note 69, at 127.
82. See Commission Interpretive Communication, supra note 14.
83. See Case T-258/06, Comm’n v Germany, 2010 E.C.R. II-2033, II-2046–50 (in which
Germany argued, first, that the Commission was not merely explaining the case law but instead
attempting to create new rules and, second, that only national law should be applicable to below-
threshold contracts); see also Zso´fia Petersen, Below-Threshold Contract Awards Under EU Primary
Law: Federal Republic of Germany v Commission (T-258/06), 19 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV.
NA215, NA215 (2010).
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to be applicable.84 The EU Treaty principles will, therefore, apply when
there is an interest by an undertaking, based in a foreign Member State, in
bidding directly on a contract.85
Conversely, indirect cross-border interest is based on the possibility of a
domestic undertaking deciding to supply the contracting authority with
goods produced in a second Member State or a foreign undertaking using
a local subsidiary to bid for the contract.86 The indirect cross-border interest
is, arguably, a problem for the freedom of movement of goods and establish-
ment; while applicable as a principle to public procurement, it impacts more
than just this field of law.87 Consequently, regardless of the nature of the
buyer, whether a contracting authority or a private legal person, the afore-
mentioned Treaty principles would always be applicable.88 The cross-border
interest test should only apply, therefore, to undertakings bidding directly on
a contract tendered by a contracting authority based in another Member
State (i.e., to direct cross-border interests).89
B. Real or Potential Cross-Border Interest?
A second issue of concern regarding the cross-border interest requirement
is the lack of clarity regarding whether the test must be applied only to real
interests by a foreign undertaking to participate in the contract, or also to
hypothetical ones. This lack of clarity presents a problem for the contracting
authority that must make a decision on the cross-border interest issue before
tender. It also illustrates the inconsistency of the Court of Justice’s jurispru-
dence and the consequences of legal uncertainty.
In Coname and Parking Brixen the Court held that the interest test could
be hypothetical.90 Therefore, if a contract could potentially be of interest to
undertakings based in other Member States, then the Treaty principles, in-
cluding the need to advertise the contract, would apply.91 Under this ap-
proach, the contracting authority would need to determine if a contract
could potentially be of interest and act accordingly before starting the pro-
curement procedure.92 For example, a contracting authority could review
84. See Case C-231/03, Coname, 2005 E.C.R. at I-7316–17, I-7320; Case C-458/03, Parking
Brixen, 2005 E.C.R. at I-8586, I-8598.
85. See Case C-231/03, Coname, 2005 E.C.R. at I-7316–17, I-7320; Case C-458/03, Parking
Brixen, 2005 E.C.R. at I-8586, I-8598.
86. See RAMBOLL MGMT. CONSULTING, CROSS-BORDER PROCUREMENT ABOVE EU THRESHOLDS
9 (2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/modernising_
rules/cross-border-procurement_en.pdf [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
87. See RISVIG HANSEN, supra note 59, at 128–29.
88. For a dissenting view, see ARROWSMITH, THE LAW OF PUBLIC AND UTILITIES PROCURE-
MENT, supra note 6, at 193, 209 (presenting the argument that the Treaty advertisement require-
ments are not applicable to “situations with no cross-border element,” but there is no such
restriction on the Directives).
89. See RISVIG HANSEN, supra note 59, at 128 n.18.
90. See Case C-231/03, Coname, 2005 E.C.R. at I-7295.
91. Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen GmbH v. Gemeinde Brixen and Stadtwerke Brixen AG,
2005 E.C.R. I-8585, I-8586, I-8598.
92. See Case C-231/03, Coname, 2005 E.C.R. at I-7308.
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previous experiences with similar contracts to guide his or her decision. This
approach, however, is replete with uncertainty for four reasons: (1) past par-
ticipation by foreign undertakings is not an indication of future interest or
lack thereof; (2) if a contracting authority is tendering a contract for the
first time, it will not have a basis for comparison; (3) the contracting author-
ity may be unfamiliar with the broader European market to decide on the
prospective, hypothetical interests that foreign undertakings might have in
its contract; and (4) it leaves the contracting authority at the mercy of the
market. Thus, this approach presents the risk that if the contracting author-
ity determined that there was no hypothetical cross-border interest—and con-
sequently did not follow EU law—but that determination was later found to
be erroneous, the contracting authority may have violated its nondiscrimina-
tion obligation.93
In more recent decisions such as Commission v. Ireland, the Court has
highlighted situations where the cross-border interest was real; indeed, the
contract was advertised and foreign undertakings submitted bids.94 In
those situations, there was no doubt that the contracts had cross-border in-
terest.95 It is only relatively easy, however, to determine a real cross-border
interest in hindsight, after a contract is advertised.96 The true underlying
issue here is identifying, in advance, the situations where cross-border interest
exists and to consequently know what principles and rules govern the
contract.97
C. Certain or Uncertain Cross-Border Interest?
In Commission v. Ireland and Strong Seguranc¸a, the Court held that con-
tracts needed to have a certain cross-border interest and implied that there
needs to be a qualified interest in the contract for Treaty principles to
apply.98 The Court’s reasoning restricts the application of the Treaty prin-
ciples to fewer contracts by demanding a concrete interest from a foreign un-
dertaking.99 This jurisprudence was maintained in SECAP, where the Court
held that the contract value, location, and technical complexity justified the
93. See Commission Interpretive Communication, supra note 14, at 3 (noting that the principle
of nondiscrimination implies an obligation of transparency, requiring “that an undertaking
located in another Member State has access to appropriate information regarding the contract
before it is awarded, so that, if it so wishes, it would be in a position to express its interest in
obtaining that contract”).
94. Case C-226/09, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2010 E.C.R. I-11824, I-11830.
95. See id. at I-11830, I-11833.
96. See id. at I-11833.
97. See Braun, supra note 69, at 40–42; see also Case C-226/09, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2010
E.C.R. at I-11830, I-11833 (addressing situations with real cross-border interest, but declining
to resolve the issue of advance identification of cross-border interest).
98. See Case C-507/03, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2007 E.C.R. I-9777, I-9807–08; Case C-95/10,
Strong Seguranc¸a SA v. Municı´pio de Sintra, 2011 E.C.R. I-1867, I-1880, I-1883.
99. See Case C-507/03, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2007 E.C.R. at I-9807–08; Case C-95/10, Strong
Seguranc¸a, 2011 E.C.R. at I-1880, I-1883.
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possibility of direct interest by foreign undertakings.100 The Court added, in
some circumstances, even low-value contracts could contain cross-border in-
terest, negating the presumption that low-value contracts were of no rele-
vance to the Internal Market.101
There are a number of objections to the test proposed by the Court of
Justice, all of which are connected to the lack of legal certainty regarding
the cross-border interest test.102 First, the issue of advance identification
of a contract’s cross-border interest remains unresolved.103 In essence, the
Court is asking contracting authorities to predict with complete accuracy
that the contract being tendered will not spark interest from a foreign under-
taking.104 Not only is this impossible to determine in advance, but also it is
almost impossible to assess afterwards; if the contract were not advertised at
all, how would anyone know about it and express an interest?105
Second, identical contracts tendered by the same contracting authority on
different dates may affect whether it has a cross-border interest. Because the
economic climate is constantly changing, a contract that would not have at-
tracted international interest in the past might do so today, particularly as
new companies come into the market or competition becomes fiercer due
to the difficult economic environment.
Third, identical contracts tendered by two contracting authorities at the
same time may or may not have cross-border interest. For example, two hy-
pothetical French local contracting authorities based near the border with
Germany could issue identical contracts on the same date. A German com-
pany bids for the first but not the second contract. According to the jurispru-
dence of the Court of Justice, the first contract will need to follow the EU
Treaty principles, whereas the second does not.106 This leads to the paradox
that the identical contracts issued by similar organizations might or might
not concurrently have a cross-border interest.
In addition to the issues discussed supra, the Court of Justice’s jurispru-
dence has yet to answer three remaining questions. First, what if a foreign
undertaking looks at the contract and decides not to participate? Second,
what if the foreign undertaking submits the selection documents but does
not submit a bid? Do either of these scenarios constitute a certain and real
cross-border interest? Finally, should not the rules be defined before the
start of the procedure; indeed, how can they depend on the actual participa-
tion by an undertaking?
100. See Joined Cases C-147/06 & C-148/06, SECAP SpA v. Comune di Torino, 2008 E.C.R.
I-3565, I-3566, I-3596.
101. See id.
102. See supra Part I for a description of the cross-border interest test.
103. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
104. See Case C-507/03, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2007 E.C.R. at I-9807–08 (implying that there
must be a certain qualified cross-border interest for Treaty principles to apply).
105. For similar views on the difficulties raised, see Caranta, supra note 62, at 47–48.
106. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps the lack of participation raised in the first question would be suf-
ficient proof to ascertain that there is no certain cross-border interest.107
The second and third questions, however, are more complex. The rules
should be defined at the start of the procurement procedure and cannot de-
pend on the actual participation or withdrawal of participants during the
procedure; they should not be subject to change.108 The certain cross-border
interest test must, therefore, always be hypothetical and require a value judg-
ment by a contracting authority with the information reasonably available to
it at the time.109 But even then, the underlying issue of limited legal certainty
would still remain.110
D. Impact of the Court of Justice (R)evolving Jurisprudence
It becomes clear from the prior discussion that the most obvious criticism
to be made regarding the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice is the lack of
legal certainty with the cross-border interest test. Indeed, the Court itself has
modified the test over the last few years, perhaps precisely due to its difficult
nature. The Court’s evolving jurisprudence demonstrates a case-by-case ap-
proach and uncertainty regarding how key elements can be analyzed in ad-
vance.111 The Court is correct in extending the application of EU law to
low-value contracts, but it has failed to resolve the legal uncertainty arising
from the cross-border interest test.
In the EU, there is currently a two-tier system in public procurement:112
the above-the-thresholds approach ensures that all stakeholders know that
the EU procurement Directives are applicable113 and thus provides legal cer-
tainty, but the below-the-thresholds approach is rife with legal uncertainty
created by the cross-border interest test and increases transaction costs
and compliance risks associated with public procurement.114
In addition, even if it were possible to carry out the cross-border interest
test reliably in advance, it still would not solve the underlying problem that
contracts under the thresholds are not harmonized, with each Member
State’s regulating them as they see fit.115 For example, the Hungarian thresh-
107. See id. at 16, 87 (noting that seventy-two percent of surveyed businesses with experience
in EU public procurement had “not engaged in cross-border tendering at all in the past three
years”).
108. See Chandler v. Camden LBC, [2010] 1 C.M.L.R. 19, [30], [66].
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See supra Part IV.A–C.
112. See Brown, supra note 81, at 19–21.
113. Commission Interpretive Communication, supra note 14, at 2 (specifying that the Procure-
ment Directives do not apply to contracts below certain thresholds).
114. Pedro Telles, Low Value Procurement and Transparency: Squaring Circle, in 5TH INTERNA-
TIONAL PROCUREMENT CONFERENCE PAPERS 1376, 1387 (2012), available at http://www.ippa.org/
ippc5_proceedings6.html; Arrowsmith, Modernising the European Union’s Public Procurement Re-
gime, supra note 37, at 73–79.
115. See THE REGULATION OF CONTRACT BELOW THE EU THRESHOLD, supra note 25, at 14–15
(“Hungary requires publication for contracts above EUR 27,000”).
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old for national advertising is $35,000, but the country “allows negotiations
if indicated in the contract notices.”116 Since 2011, France has mandated na-
tional advertising for contracts over $20,000.117 Portugal only sets the adver-
tising threshold for goods and services contracts at over $100,000.118 Since
2011, the United Kingdom (UK) purchasing bodies under control of the
Westminster Government must advertise all contracts over $16,000.119
Moreover, the regulations can vary, even within each Member State.120 In
the UK, contracting authorities in England are bound by the $16,000 thresh-
old, but authorities in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland are not.121
In sum, the cross-border interest test appears to be a legal construction by
the Court of Justice to try solving the problem of applying EU law (even if
only the Treaty principles) to contracts excluded from the Procurement
Directives.122 The problem for low-value contracts remains the current
thresholds regime. The Court has been unable to resolve this conundrum
because of the uncertainty created by the cross-border test for the contract-
ing authority.123 This begs the question: what would happen if the EU
thresholds were lowered to cover most EU public procurement contracts?
V. LOWERING THE EU THRESHOLDS
The EU should lower the threshold values to encompass the majority of
contracts awarded. In other words, the current 80/20 split between regulat-
ing contracts above and below thresholds should be inverted to ensure that
116. Id. at 15.
117. CODE DES MARCHE´S PUBLICS, art. 28 (Fr.) (requiring advertising for contracts over
€15,000). The threshold sat at €4000 previously. See De Mars, supra note 69, at 330–31.
118. PUBLIC CONTRACTS CODE 2008, art. 21(1)(a) (Port.). Between 2010 and 2012, contract-
ing authorities were authorized under the national law to award goods and services contracts
without advertising for contracts above the EU thresholds in clear violation of EU law. See
Miguel Assis Raimundo, Direct Award of Public Contracts: The New Portuguese Public Contracts
Code in Light of EU Law, 19 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 155, 157, 159 (2010).
119. CABINET OFFICE, TRANSPARENCY: PUBLICATION OF TENDER DOCUMENTATION GUIDANCE
NOTE, 2011, at 2 (U.K.) [hereinafter PUBLICATION OF TENDER DOCUMENTATION] (requiring pub-
lication for contracts valued over £10,000); CABINET OFFICE, TRANSPARENCY: PUBLICATION OF
NEW CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS GUIDANCE NOTE, 2012, at 6–7; Kate Creelman, The
UK Cabinet Office’s Initiative on Small and Medium Enterprises, 21 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV.
NA293, NA293 (2012).
120. See infra note 136.
121. PUBLICATION OF TENDER DOCUMENTATION, supra note 119, at 3, 13.
122. See THE REGULATION OF CONTRACT BELOW THE EU THRESHOLD, supra note 25, at 12.
Member States have developed their framework of below-threshold policies, rules and proce-
dures against the background of a number of rulings by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
These rulings state that contracting authorities and entities concluding contracts outside of
the scope of the Public Procurement Directives must comply with the fundamental principles
of the EU Treaty in general and the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality
in particular, where those contracts are of certain cross-border interest.
Id.
123. See supra Part III.A–C.
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EU rules apply to a larger percentage of the EU Internal Market for public
procurement.124
If the thresholds were lowered to capture most public procurement con-
tracts, four consequences can be expected. First, the perceived Internal Mar-
ket would expand and incorporate more contracts, requiring more tenders to
be advertised across Europe and follow standardized EU procedures.125 Sec-
ond, there would be an increase in transparency, competition, and nondis-
crimination126—the precise goals that justified the initial adoption of the
EU public procurement Directives.127 Third, legal certainty would increase
as the need to use the cross-border test diminished.128 Fourth, the bulk of
EU procurement would be subject to similar, harmonized rules just as
those over the EU thresholds.129
A. Recognizing That Contracts Below the Thresholds
Are Already Part of the Internal Market
EU public procurement rules rely on the TFEU and, more specifically,
on the development of the Internal Market.130 Lowering the thresholds
and applying the full scope of EU law to a much larger base of contracts
would increase the perceived size of the Internal Market’s public procure-
ment component.131 Conversely, one could argue, as Germany argued in
Commission v Germany, that low-value contracts, by definition, have no rele-
vance to the Internal Market and are inherently national affairs.132 Most con-
tracts below the thresholds, thus far, have been of national interest as the
thresholds function as a nontariff trade barrier against foreign undertak-
ings.133 This barrier effect on contracts below the thresholds is due to the
124. See supra Part I.
125. All contracts above the threshold are subject to the requirements of the public procure-
ment Directives, including requirements for the advertisement of tenders in the O.J. and provi-
sions standardizing procurement procedures. For early efforts, see Council Directive 71/305,
supra note 9. For current requirements, see Council Directive 2004/17, supra note 10.
126. Transparency International has argued the same on their submission to the 2011 public
consultation on the reform of EU public procurement. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON
MODERNISING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT POLICY IN THE EU (2010).
127. See, e.g., Arrowsmith, The Past and Future Evolution of EC Procurement Law, supra note 3,
at 339–40.
128. The number of contracts subject to the cross-border test will decrease as the threshold is
lowered. See supra Part I.
129. Contracts above the threshold are subject to regulations unifying procurement proce-
dures within the EU. See supra Part I.
130. See supra Part I.
131. While public procurement is not specifically addressed in Internal Market provisions of
the TFEU, see TFEU, supra note 1, arts. 3, 26 at 17, 51, 59, it is mentioned in the Introduction
as essential to the achievement of Internal Market objectives, see supra Part I.
132. See Case T-258/06, Comm’n v Germany, 2010 E.C.R. II-2033, II-2048. The Court of
Justice dispelled this presumption in SECAP. See generally Joined Cases C-147/06 & C-148/06,
SECAP SpA v. Comune di Torino, 2008 E.C.R. I-3565, I-3566, I-3596.
133. However, the issue of cross-border procurement deserves further investigation as
EU cross-border wins are extremely rare. See PUBLIC PROCUREMENT INDICATORS 2011, supra
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lack of advertising across the EU and the lack of harmonized rules.134 Under
national regulations for contracts below the threshold, Member States can
either advertise them—solely at the national level—or not at all.135 More-
over, each Member State establishes its own rules and practices; these do
not necessarily need to be similar to other Member States’.136 Additionally,
the cross-border interest test has been applied in only a limited number of
cases. Who knows what would happen if more contracts had followed
EU-wide advertising requirements and similar rules?
The cross-border interest test, however, demonstrates that there is an
Internal Market for contracts below the thresholds;137 the existence of this
Internal Market would justify the Court of Justice’s creation of the cross-
border test. Despite the lack of specific legal support, a perplexing cross-
border interest test, and no harmonized regulations, there are still low-
value contracts that are deemed to be significant enough to the Internal
Market.138 This “below-thresholds Internal Market” warrants regulation
by the same EU procurement rules as the contracts above the thresholds.
The EU thresholds were introduced in the Works Directive in 1977 and
created before the Internet became part of the economy, which, in turn, re-
duced transaction and opportunity costs.139 As such, the thresholds have
never taken into consideration the cost reduction created by Internet trans-
actions. Now, arguably, it is economically viable to conduct cross-border
transactions with lower costs than before the introduction of the Internet.
Thirty-five years ago it would have been unthinkable to buy goods online
from foreign suppliers or hire the services of a foreign consultant for values
below the thresholds. Now, service contracts can be performed ex situ and
goods or supplies can be transported at much lower costs; such examples
exemplify contracts that now belong to the Internal Market.
note 19, at 97 (reporting that only three percent of 540,000 procurements reviewed were
awarded to foreign undertakings).
134. National publication requirements vary widely across Member States with practices fur-
ther fragmented by States through the use of additional “bands” below the Internal Market
threshold. See THE REGULATION OF CONTRACT BELOW THE EU THRESHOLD, supra note 25, at
14–16.
135. See id.
136. See generally id.
137. See THE REGULATION OF CONTRACT BELOW THE EU THRESHOLD, supra note 25, at 12
(noting that the cross-border interest test is an extension of the antidiscrimination principles
embodied in the TFEU, suggesting a similarity of the markets both above and below the
thresholds).
138. See supra Part IV (discussing precedential cases, including Telaustria, Coname, and Park-
ing Brixen) and Parts IV.A–C (discussing the nature of the cross-border interest required to
trigger Internal Market mechanisms).
139. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE INTERNET AND BUSINESS PERFORMANCE
10–11 (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/2731209.pdf (exploring the effects of the
emergence of the Internet on business enterprises and highlighting policy issues implicated for
governments).
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It seems imprudent to set thresholds for public procurement contracts af-
fecting the Internal Market in Europe at $172,000 for services or $6,642,000
for works.140 Or, alternatively, one should ask, if the thresholds were being
created today for the first time, would they be set at such values and what
compromise would the Member States strike? The compromise for thresh-
olds, if formulated today, would almost certainly set lower threshold values
than originally established. Essentially, the original EU and GPA thresholds
have functioned as an “anchor” to be used as a starting point for any nego-
tiations. The thresholds have thus survived the paradigm shift caused by the
Internet without any renovation.
The full adoption of e-procurement could rebalance the equation regard-
ing transaction costs for advertising low-value contracts.141 In fact, the Eu-
ropean Commission is further promoting e-procurement by recommending
the implementation of “end-to-end e-procurement”142 and mandating the
use of electronic means in procurement procedures by 2016.143 Portugal
has already implemented the recommendations and has mandated, since
2010, that all procurement, irrespective of value, be conducted through elec-
tronic methods.144
B. Added Transparency and Competition
Member States such as France,145 Ireland,146 and the United Kingdom147—
understanding the value of increased transparency and open markets—require
140. See Table 1, supra Part II.
141. See Green Paper on Expanding the Use of E-Procurement in the EU, at 4, SEC (2010) 1214
final (Oct. 18, 2010) (noting that electronic public procurement can “reduce administrative costs
and speed up individual procurement procedures”).
142. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, on End-to-End E-Procurement to
Modernise Public Administration, at 2, COM (2013) 453 final ( Jun. 26, 2013) [hereinafter End-
to-End E-Procurement to Modernise Public Administration].
143. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on A Strategy for E-Procurement,
at 3, COM (2012) 179 final (Apr. 20, 2012) [hereinafter A Strategy for E-Procurement]. In addi-
tion, the European Commission presented in June 2013 a draft Directive on electronic invoicing
in public procurement, which is yet to be agreed to by the Council and the European Parlia-
ment. Press Release, European Comm’n, E-Invoicing in Public Procurement: Another Step
Towards End-to-End E-Procurement and E-Government in Europe ( June 26, 2013) (on file
with author).
144. See Study on the Evaluation of the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Legal Framework
for Electronic Procurement (Phase II), at 27 (July 9, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_
market/consultations/docs/2010/e-procurement/siemens-study_en.pdf.
145. See Francois Liche`re, Public Procurement Contracts Below EU Thresholds and Annnex II B
Services in France, in 4 OUTSIDE THE EU PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVES, supra note 61, at 97, 100;
De Mars, supra note 69, at 330–31.
146. GOV’T OF IR., DEP’T OF FIN., CIRCULAR 10/10: FACILITATING SME PARTICIPATION IN PUB-
LIC PROCUREMENT 5 (2010). This circular mandated all contracting authorities in Ireland to ad-
vertise contracts over €25,000, but its enforceability is unclear in cases of noncompliance by Irish
contracting authorities. See id.
147. See Luke Butler, Below Threshold and Annex II B Service Contracts in the United Kingdom:
A Common Law Approach, in 4 OUTSIDE THE EU PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVES, supra note 61, at
283, 294; Telles, supra note 114, at 1378–79.
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contracts over $20,000, $12,000, and $15,000, respectively, to be advertised
via national public procurement portals.148 This development, requested by
industry at least in the UK,149 only solves part of the EU procurement prob-
lem; indeed, e-procurement is beneficial for national suppliers, but it does
not ensure equal treatment or harmonized rules across different Member
States.150
Lowering the thresholds will also be beneficial because such action will
lead to increased competition for public procurement.151 Higher contract
visibility increases the possibility of an undertaking showing interest in a cer-
tain contract and presenting a bid.152 This increased visibility, however, can
also create three potential risks. First, in the UK there is a perception that if a
contracting authority uses the open procedure to advertise low-value con-
tracts, it may be inundated with offers. This scenario has not occurred
yet.153 Second, there is the risk that increased transparency can lead to col-
lusion by tenderers.154 Although this risk cannot be discounted, collusion is
already present in both contracts over the current thresholds and below the
thresholds that are advertised solely via national or regional official journals
and portals.155 But increasing contract advertising across the EU could raise
the potential of foreign undertakings bidding for contracts and the possibil-
ity of collusion.156
Third, the EU procurement procedures could potentially increase trans-
action and opportunity costs, which would negatively impact competition.157
In the past, however, EU-regulated procedures have required excessive
and extensive compliance; current transaction and opportunity costs for
low-value contracts158 do not indicate future values will remain constant.
There are also multiple ways to reduce the transaction costs associated
148. Liche`re, supra note 145, at 100; GOV’T OF IR., supra note 146, at 5; Butler, supra note 147,
at 294; Telles, supra note 114, at 1376–77.
149. See UNIV. OF GLAMORGAN, BARRIERS TO PROCUREMENT: OPPORTUNITY RESEARCH 49
(2009); see also FED’N OF SMALL BUSINESSES, LOCAL PROCUREMENT: MAKING THE MOST OF
SMALL BUSINESS 5 (2012).
150. See infra Part V.D (discussing the merits of harmonization of procurement regimes).
151. See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 126 (discussing the benefits of lowering the thresh-
olds, including lower risk of misuse and corruption).
152. See A Strategy for E-Procurement, supra note 143, at 3 (noting that increased transparency
through e-procurement will improve access to procurement opportunities).
153. Neither in the contracts subject to mandatory advertising over €12,000 in England, nor in
the author’s experience in Wales on a pilot study of a simplified open procedure, has there been an
overabundance of bids.
154. ALBERT SA´NCHEZ GRAELLS, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND THE EU COMPETITION RULES 358
(2011).
155. See generally id.
156. See A Strategy for E-Procurement, supra note 143, at 3.
157. See Arrowsmith, Modernising the European Union’s Public Procurement Regime, supra
note 37, at 75; Boyle, supra note 38, at NA175 (stating that costs of current procedures are
already high).
158. COST AND EFFECTIVENESS REPORT, supra note 25, at 7 (describing restricted procedures).
The number of person days involved on a public procurement procedure remains unrelated to
the value of the contract. Id. at 91.
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with existing procedures. Indeed, as part of the ongoing procurement re-
form, the European Commission has proposed streamlining the selection
stage in the open procedure159 via the European Single Procurement Docu-
ment and self-declarations.160 Lower transaction and opportunity costs for
the benefit of competition can be achieved by simplification of processes.161
Introducing a number of changes in the procedure, timescales, and practice
makes it possible to reduce the duration of a procedure from an average of
120 days in the UK to approximately thirty-eight to forty days.162 Thus, ref-
ormations to reduce the costs for both contracting authorities and suppliers
should be implemented.
C. Legal Certainty
The last fifteen years have provided evidence that the current regime
fails to work because of legal uncertainty in the cross-border interest
test and a solution, as of yet, has not been identified.163 Additionally, the
Court of Justice has applied the cross-border interest test to low-value con-
tracts, contracts that are typically omitted for being under the EU thresh-
olds.164 If the cross-border interest test is such a key feature of the EU pub-
lic procurement regime, then it should be applied to all contracts including
ones covered by the EU Directives. Moreover, the EU has adopted a mea-
sure that reduces legal uncertainty and lowers compliance costs for larger
159. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Public Procure-
ment, supra note 11, at 55–56.
160. More, however, should have been achieved such as allowing for shorter timescales for
the open procedure than the forty days proposed for bid submissions. See id. at 85–86.
161. See Christine Boch, The Implementation of the Public Procurement Directives in the United
Kingdom: Devolution or Divergence? 16 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 410, 431 (2007) (arguing for
the importance of low transaction costs from an SME perspective); see alsoDG ENTER. & INDUS.,
EVALUATION OF SMES’ ACCESS TO PUBLIC PROCUREMENT MARKETS IN THE EU (2010) (studying
the impact of certain factors on SMEs’ likelihood of winning public contracts and SMEs’ expe-
rience with electronic tools such as e-procurement solutions). This author has extensive experi-
ence in piloting a simplified open procedure for low-value contracts in the UK. His work in-
cluded the Winning in Tendering project with three Welsh contracting authorities. See
“Winning in Tendering” Public Procurement Research Project, BANGOR UNIV., http://www.bangor.
ac.uk/law/winningintendering.php.en (last visited Oct. 1, 2013). Although the original pilot
was to devise a procedure that could be applicable to the €6000–60,000 bracket, two pilot author-
ities are considering rolling out the use to contracts up to the thresholds, due to the satisfaction of
procurers, internal stakeholders, and suppliers. See generally TELLES, supra note 114, at 1378–79.
162. Pedro Telles, Surprise, Surprise: The UK Has the Most Expensive Procurement System in
Europe, PROCUREMENT INSIGHTS (Aug. 19, 2013), http://procureinsights.wordpress.com/2013/
08/19/surprise-surprise-the-uk-has-the-most-expensive-public-procurement-system-in-europe-
by-dr-pedro-telles/. Cyprus is also using a simplified open procedure for the purposes of speed-
ing up the procedure and reducing transaction and opportunity costs. THE REGULATION OF
CONTRACT BELOW THE EU THRESHOLD, supra note 25, at 14. Outside the EU, Albania has a sim-
plified procedure as well for contracts above ALL 2,000,000, or just over €14,000. See Marco
Roccia, The New Albanian Law on Public Procurement, 17 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. NA153,
NA156 (2008). Canada has looked into this issue. See OFFICE OF THE PROCUREMENT OMBUDS-
MAN, DIRECTED CONTRACTS UNDER $25,000—A RISK-BASED STUDY, at ii (2010).
163. See supra Part IV.C.
164. See supra Part IV.
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contracts; by the same logic, smaller contracts could benefit from similar
measures.165
D. Harmonization and Simplification
The final consequence of lowering the thresholds would be the harmoni-
zation of legislation applicable to the majority of public procurement in Eu-
rope. While legal requirements imposed by EU law have filtered down to
contracts below the thresholds in a number of Member States,166 it is incon-
sistent across the EU.167 For example, in 2010 the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) observed, inter alia, that
in areas such as remedies, methods of submission of applications and tenders,
award criteria, and design of technical specifications, rules were similar in
most Member States, and implies that this is a generalized practice.168 Portu-
gal, for example, does not distinguish between contracts above or below the
thresholds in access to remedies,169 and Spain has merged the substantive
legal regime above and below the thresholds.170 Essentially, it appears that
Member States do not differentiate between the two different legal regimes
for contracts above and below the thresholds and are merging the categories
to create a unified regime.171 Each Member State, however, has done this in-
dividually and generally applies only parts of the above-threshold legal
regime.172
The EU legal regime would be simplified if the threshold levels were re-
duced; undertakings would be able to expect similar procedures and reme-
dies across all Member States instead of the current maze of legal regimes
and practices.173 The counter-argument against this simplification is that ap-
plying EU law and procedures to low-value contracts would actually increase
compliance, transaction, and opportunity costs.174 In essence, it is the same
overarching argument proffered by Arrowsmith and Boyle to increase the
165. See infra Part V.D.
166. See THE REGULATION OF CONTRACT BELOW THE EU THRESHOLD, supra note 25, at 15.
This could be another explanation of why the European Commission found that eighteen per-
cent of the supplies and services contracts procured by central government and advertised in the
O.J. had a value below thresholds. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT INDICATORS 2011, supra note 19, at 69.
167. THE REGULATION OF CONTRACT BELOW THE EU THRESHOLD, supra note 25, at 15.
168. Id. at 8–9.
169. See generallyORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., SIGMA PAPERS NO. 41, PUBLIC PRO-
CUREMENT REVIEW AND REMEDIES SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 95 (2007) (discussing the
remedies available in Portugal’s public procurement system).
170. Albeit Spain has a specific regime for contracts below €50,000. See Albert Sanchez
Gra´ells, Public Procurement Below EU Thresholds in Spain, in 4 OUTSIDE THE EU PROCUREMENT
DIRECTIVES, supra note 61, at 259, 261.
171. See THE REGULATION OF CONTRACT BELOW THE EU THRESHOLD, supra note 25, at 8–9,
13–19.
172. See id. at 8–9.
173. See Arrowsmith, Modernising the European Union’s Public Procurement Regime, supra note
37, at 78.
174. Id. at 81.
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thresholds.175 Although this risk does exist, the harmonization of legal re-
gimes already seen for contracts above the thresholds demonstrates that suc-
cessful implementation could be achieved in the Member States.176
Harmonization below thresholds should not, however, be done identically
to what was done above thresholds. This Article acknowledges that some
rules, from the Procurement Directives requirements to national prac-
tices,177 for above the thresholds are indeed terribly onerous for all partici-
pants.178 For example, the UK is the only Member State that uses the more
burdensome restricted procedure179 more often than the open procedure180
because the former imposes a full-fledged selection stage before tenders are
to be submitted.181 In addition, even when the UK decided to mandate the
use of the open procedure for certain contracts, it did not fine-tune the pro-
cedure for low-value contracts.182 Rather, it retained the identical structure
and practice used for contracts above the EU thresholds.183 Moreover, it is
still aiming to undertake an open procedure in 120 days,184 when low-value
contracts can be completed in around forty.185 The decision not to optimize
the procedure for such contracts is based in particular national policy and
cannot be justified by any EU-law-related obligation.186
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the status quo of public procurement regulation
in the EU and the two-tier system for contracts above and below thresholds.
In 2011, only 17.7%187 of contracts in Europe were above thresholds and
fully subject to EU law via the TFEU Treaty Principles and the public pro-
curement Directives. The bulk of the money spent in public procurement in
the EU escapes such regulation. The remainder is subject to a confusing sys-
175. See id.; Boyle, supra note 38, at NA181.
176. See Arrowsmith, Introduction to the EU, supra note 8, at 27–33 (describing the above-the-
threshold legal framework that creates such harmonization). See also Arrowsmith,Modernising the
European Union’s Public Procurement Regime, supra note 37, at 82.
177. COST AND EFFECTIVENESS REPORT, supra note 25, at 34 (noting the differences among
member states in the frequency with which they use open procurement procedures).
178. See id. at 117.
179. Council Directive 2004/18, supra note 10, at 127 (supplying the definition of restricted
procedure).
180. The UK is the Member State where the restricted procedure is more used as a percent-
age of total procurement procedures, representing forty-four percent of the total procedure use
in the EU. COST AND EFFECTIVENESS REPORT, supra note 25, at 30, 105.
181. See id. at 78.
182. See Jason Waterman & Clifford McCue, Lean Thinking Within Public Sector Purchasing
Department: The Case of the UK Public Service, 12 J. PUB. PROCUREMENT 505, 516–18 (2012).
183. Id. at 514, 516–18.
184. CABINET OFFICE, GOVERNMENT SOURCING: A NEW APPROACH USING LEAN, 2012, at 4
(U.K.). It has, however, introduced the ContractsFinder portal (www.contractsfinder.co.uk) and
also tried to reduce the use of the restricted and competitive dialogue procedures. Id. at 3.
185. See id. at 4, 6; Telles, supra note 162.
186. See THE REGULATION OF CONTRACT BELOW THE EU THRESHOLD, supra note 25, at 12.
187. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT INDICATORS 2011, supra note 19, at 6.
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tem mixing national law and EU Treaty principles. Effective regulation of
public procurement at the European level depends on the achievement of
the Internal Market, but this small percentage makes the public procurement
side of that market look very small. Because the Treaty principles apply in
cases where the contract is expected to have a cross-border interest, resolving
the uncertainties around cross-border interests is critical to expanding the
reach of EU law.
It has become clear that a decade of jurisprudence by the Court of Justice
of the European Union, from Telaustria to Strong Seguranc¸a, has not solved
the legal issues surrounding the cross-border interest test. The Court was
right in extending the concept of the Internal Market to contracts below
the thresholds, but it has extended the test in piecemeal fashion and it is
therefore prone to legal uncertainty. Lowering the thresholds and recogniz-
ing that most public procurement contracts are part of the EU Internal Mar-
ket would address the problems exacerbated by the Court’s jurisprudence.
The current thresholds were set at levels deemed convenient by Member
States through political expediency; they are not based on the real impact
of each contract on the Internal Market. Because the current threshold levels
lack any legal justification, there is also no reason why lower-value contracts
should be treated differently from contracts above the threshold.
The current threshold levels may have been reasonable thirty or forty
years ago when initially introduced, but their financial values are still rooted
in the preconception that cross-border transactions have high transaction
and opportunity costs by definition. In light of the effects the Internet has
had on cross-border trade and the ongoing push for more e-procurement,
including “end-to-end e-procurement” advocated by the European Commis-
sion,188 the thresholds should be reconsidered and reformatted. As transac-
tion and opportunity costs have decreased over time, the equilibrium that
justified the original threshold levels no longer applies. As such, today
there is no economic reason not to apply the bulk of EU procurement reg-
ulation to lower-valued contracts.
Although there are still risks associated with lowering the thresholds, such
as the potential for increased collusion or higher transaction and opportunity
costs in some instances, the overall benefits outweigh the risks. The potential
downside would be due to practices by Member States and contracting au-
thorities, not to mandatory legal requirements. It is time, in light of modern
procurement practices, for thresholds to be lowered to a value that captures
the large majority of the value spent in public procurement within the EU.
Lowering the thresholds would provide numerous advantages. Covering
most public contracts would recognize that lower-valued contracts are part
of the modern day Internal Market. Further, the same justification for apply-
ing detailed EU rules via the public procurement Directives (currently
applied to above-threshold contracts) could be extended to lower-value
188. See End-to-End E-Procurement to Modernise Public Administration, supra note 142, at 5.
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contracts—it would increase transparency and competition. Also, the legal
uncertainty raised by the cross-border interest test would be solved.
Finally, Member States already regulate contracts below thresholds. In
many Member States, specific parts of the above-threshold legal regime,
such as remedies, means of submission of applications and tenders, award
criteria, and technical specifications, have filtered down to contracts below
the thresholds. This, however, is being done on an ad hoc basis without
any consistency across different Member States. Having a single harmonized
legal regime for contracts currently below threshold would create more legal
certainty for contracting authorities.
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